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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The popularity of storing data in the "cloud" has increased in recent past because of its cost effectiveness compared to traditional storage systems. In cloud environment, the clients pay only for the resources that they use, and they are more reliable due to the redundancy provided by replications presented in the cloud server. When outsourcing sensitive data such as financial and health records, it becomes a problem of data privacy as users are giving control of their data to third party where in this case it is the cloud provider. The primary way to maintain confidentiality of user's data is to encrypt them using a key, which is only known to the particular user. However, data encryption does not fully guarantee the privacy since the patterns of data access could leak considerable information about the stored data.
From clients' data access patterns, a server can monitor their queries and perform it's own traffic analysis.Remote server can learn the regular accessing patterns of data, and try to relate it to other client information gained by the third party channels. For example, suppose there is always certain stock exchange action take place after query sequence of q1, q2 and q3 from the client. In this case, a curious server can learn about the content of the queries. In C-ORAM proposed by Zhang et. al. [7] there are two entities in client side:multiple users who trust each other, and shared agent. In general we can assume they belong to same organization. C-ORAM support two kind of operations, data query and data shuffling. Querying a data item from remote storage is done by the users while shuffling done by the shared agent.The motivation to develope a system like this is to detach the overhead incured in shuffling In this study, we implement C-ORAM which works with a FUSE-based distributed file system. Experimental results show that users access pattern can be preserved in that there is no difference between querying one same element and randomly picked element for multiple CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK
Oblivious RAM
Oblivious RAM was first examined as theoretical method by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [8, 9, 10] for protecting a software from piracy. In that context the processor is trusted while the memory is not. Goldreich and Ostrovsky in [9] prove that oblivious RAM (ORAM) simulation using an outsourced data requires an overhead of at least logN, for a RAM memory of size N.
When client side has only a constant size storage, they show how client capable of achieving As an index based ORAM, Stefanov et al. [12] proposed an ORAM scheme which has reduced worst-case bound for data access. Because of the lower overhead than theoretical ORAMs this is more suitable for real world application. With the ORAM scheme they show that client can achieve an amortized overhead of O(logn) and worst-case performance O(
with O( N ) storage on the client, for a constant 0 < < 1. It is also able to achieve amortized overhead of O(logN ) and similar worst-case performance, with a client side storage of O( √ N ).
The scheme of [13] provides a tree-based construction that uses poly-logarithmic O(N logN ) server storage and incurs O(log 2 N ) overhead on each access when the client has access to
Another index based ORAM (Path-ORAM) [14] proposed makes O(logN ) accesses to the server. It is performance wise better than all other ORAMs which are index based. It uses a position map and stash which are both stored at the client side. The size of position map used is n while the position map is size of log(N [19] show that overhead of O(log 2 N ) in an ORAM simulation can be achieved , with high probability, for a client with constant sized local memory, and O(logN ), for a client with O(N ) memory, for a constant > 0. Kushilevitz et al. [20] also show that one can achieve an overhead of O(log 2 N/loglogN ) in an ORAM simulation, with high probability, for a client with constant-sized local memory. 
Definition of data Item
Let F p be a finite field of p distinct elements, where p is a large prime number. Let Gp be a multiplicative, cyclic group with also p distinct elements. Hence, for any element g ∈ Gp,
.., g p−1 should all belong to G.
Each data item, denoted as Di, consists of two components: a unique data ID and the data content that is a sequence of elements of Gp. As the operations on each element of the sequence are the same, we focus our study on the operations on a single element in this work.
In practice, operations on a realistic data content are simply a sequence of operations on each element of the data content.
For the rest of this work, each data item Di is represented as (gi, di), where gi ∈ Gp is the data ID and di ∈ Gp is the data content.
Basic functionalities provided by C-ORAM
From the viewpoint of client side:
• read(data, pos) to read data at physical address pos.
• write(data, pos) to write data from physical address pos.
From the viewpoint of server side:
• store(data, pos) to store data at physical address pos(write).
• f etch(pos) to retrieve data from physical address pos(read).
Threat Model
In the threat model several assumptions are made. First, the users are trusted. The keys, used for encryption, exchange between the users are considered to be secure. Second, communication channel between users and the server is secure. Techniques such as SSL [Freier et al 21] can effectively achieve this. Third, the server is assumed to be curious but not malicious. That means server do whatever the operations mentioned in 3.1 correctly on behalf of the client, but at the same time it may try to figure out the pattern in which client access the data. This work follows standard security definition of ORAM scheme. According to the definition, ORAM system is considered secure if the server cannot pick up anything about the user's data access pattern which is formally defined in [12] as: 
System Initialization
C-ORAM organizes the storage as a hierarchy of buckets with the following properties;
• T + 1 layers, where T = [logN − log(logN loglogN )] − 1.
• φ l buckets in each layer, where φ l = 2 l+1 logN loglogN . Bottom layer of the hierarchy (LayerT ) with at least N buckets.
• Public hash function H l for each layer, which maps each element of group G p to two integers uniformly at random between 0 and φ l−1 .
• 4loglogN data items in each bucket.
• A counter, which keep track of the elements in each bucket.
At system initialization, the user is preloaded with two keys x(l) and y(l) for each layer l.
x(l) is for encrypting data id; y(l) is for encrypting data content. Initially, the user encrypts and exports all N data items to the bottom layer (T) of storage hierarchy at storage server. It is done by computing g
for each data item i and exporting to one of the two buckets generated by the hash function associated with layer T.
Data Query
To query a data item, C-ORAM executes the data query phase in iterations for each each nonempty layerl of the storage hierarchy from the top layerl = 0 to the bottom layer l = T .
To query an item D i = (g i , d i ) iteration of 6 steps are carried out.
• Step1: The user computes the encrypted ID g • Step4: Bucket request. If the bucket D i has already been found at a layer higher than l,then from following layers user randomly picks a nonempty positions. Otherwise user picks two non-empty buckets that computed from hash function.
• Step5: Storage server returns all the encrypted data items at the requested buckets directly to the user.
• Step6: User uses keys x(l) and y(l) to decrypt ID and content of return data. If desired item found, perform necessary action to the data content; otherwise, the data item is stored temporarily in a local cache at the user.
Data Upload
After all nonempty layers have been queried and the desired data item has been accessed, all the returned data items are re-encrypted and then uploaded to the storage server. The user picks a new pair of keys x(l) and y(l) randomly and re-encrypts each returned data item with these keys. Then, the re-encrypted data items are uploaded in an arbitrary order to a temporary shuffling buffer at the storage server.
Data Shuffling
Data shuffling is done as shown in [S1] Determine the layer for shuffling. As a rule, shuffling should be performed for layer l s > 0 only if (i) the number of data items in the shuffling buffer and at layers 0, ..., l s−1 is greater than or equal to the total number of buckets at layer l s−1 , and
(ii) the number of data items in the shuffling buffer and at layers 0, ..., l s is less than the total number of buckets at layer l s .
[S2] All data items at layers 0, ..., l s update such that the ID of each data item becomes encrypted by x(l s ) and the content of each data item becomes encrypted by y(l s ).
First download all data items, encrypt with users private key and upload the new items back to shuffling buffer. The new data items will be as [
[S3] For the |S| data items stored on the shuffling buffer, the user performs data-oblivious sorting, based on the new data ID.
[S4] After the end of data shuffling, the user further scans all data in the data buffer to remove the private-key encryption.
[S5] Storage server moves the data items at the shuffling buffer to the buckets at layer l s using logN random hash functions H θ ls (g 
CHAPTER 5. IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented the C-ORAM in a user-space distributed file system. With the distributed file system, we can make it easy for users to access and manage files which are physically distributed across various areas of the disk, or across a network which may be multiple disks or multiple computer systems.
FUSE
Our user-space distributed system is built based on FUSE(File System in User Space).
FUSE is an operating system mechanism for Unix-like computer operating systems that lets non-privileged users create their own file systems without editing kernel code. This is achieved by running file system code in user space while the FUSE module provides a "bridge" to the actual kernel interfaces. FUSE provide simple more uniform API function to interact with file system (Table 5 .1).Be-cause of the file system is running in the user space it is easy to debug and failures will not result in crashing the machine like kernel space file systems. 
FUSE Basic Functions
According to FUSE documentation [23] , many FUSE functions provide two ways to identify the file being operated. The default option that always available is the "path" argument, which is the full pathname (relative to the file system root) of the file in request. However, due to the expensiveness of pathname lookup, FUSE sometimes provides "file handle" in the "f use f ile inf o" structure as alternative option.
When using FUSE to implement a new file system, the first step is to set the fields in open, create, and opendir functions so that the other functions can use them. Although, the file handle in new FUSE file system implementation is a pointer to a useful data structure, it can be used as either an index into an array or a hash key, or anything else that is useful.
Following functions are some of the key function need to be modified when implementing a new file system using FUSE.
getattr(constchar * path, structstat * stbuf )
This function gets called every time whether the operation is for directory or a file. Therefore it needs to be implemented first. For the given pathname, this fills in the elements of the "stat" structure.
readdir(constchar * path, void * buf, f use f ill dir tf iller, of f tof f set, structf use f ile inf o * f i)
FUSE provides a mechanism to store the entries in a directory structure and the basic mechanism is the creation of data and calling a FUSE-supplied function to place it back in the structure.
The f ilter() is one of the function called by the readdir(). The goal of this function is to insert directory entries into the directory structure which is called as buf.f iller(). The function prototype is given as:
intf use f ill dir t(void * buf, constchar * name, conststructstat * stbuf, of f tof f );
It is important to note that the readdir() uses f iller() in a simple way as possible to just copy the related directorys filename into the mounted directory.
open(constchar * path, structf use f ile inf o * f i)
This uses to open a file. To handle the files need to allocate any necessary structures need to set the path using fi→fh which is described as absolute path above. Moreover, f i includes some additional fields that might be useful to an advanced files system. 
Overview of Implementation
To implement single virtual user (client) and remote storage (server) socket program which communication over the network in TCP/IP model is used (Figure 5 .2). When system starts single connection between client and server establish and stay as long as client disconnect from the system. 
Interaction with the fuse
Modifications to basic functions of FUSE mentioned in section 5.1 are done in the implementation in order to carry out the query process of the C-ORAM scheme. Query process get executed at the cus open() shown in Figure 5 .3 which eventually result in shuffling process mentioned in the latter part of this section. 
Data Structures
According to design, data items fall into buckets generated by hash function and there is a limit of items IDs that a bucket can hold. To facilitate this architecture layers implemented as linked list of buckets nodes (Bucket) and for each layer starting bucket and number of buckets stored at a separate structure called Layer.
Figure 5.4 Data Structures
In order to find particular data ID falls into which bucket MD5 hash function is used as shown in Figure 5 .5. The encryption and decryption operations used in the implementation, all are integer operations which are described by the system design in the chapter 3. If shuffling is needed, next step is finding to which layer shuffled data can be inserted. For that each layers item count is taken and check whether it can hold all items from layers above that (including the items in shuffling buffer). After that downloading and uploading take place via the socket connection established at the beginning. During the process re-encryption and sorting take place in order to make shuffling oblivious to storage server. 
Sort
For oblivious sort considering limited client space available batchers sort is used. Figure   5 .9 shows how pair wise compare and exchange works in batchers sort for 8 elements. 
Communication
Communication process between client and server take place is shown Figure 5 .14. Here read() and write() operations are receiving and sending out the items between client and server.
In the implementation single thread is used assuming communication is serialized which mean at a given time only one of sending or receiving operations will happen. The connection established by the client with the server eventually ends when client close the connection. • Create a socket with the socket() system call. The call to the function socket() creates socket inside the kernel and returns an integer known as socket descriptor.
• Connect the socket to the address of the server using the connect() system call. Connect operation waiting for successful connection establishment. After successful connection, the application is allowed to start sending data. The address, which is taken as an argument, contains the remote participants address.
• Send and receive data via the connection. The server sends the data on client's socket through client's socket descriptor which read by the client by its own socket descriptor.
Server communication with client work as follows:
• Create a socket with the socket() system call.
• Bind the socket to an address using the bind() system call. This operation assigns a socket to an address. binds the newly created socket to the specified address. This is the network address of the server. Address includes IP address, TCP port number of the server. After bind(), socket can accept connections to other hosts.
• Listen for connections with the listen() system call. This operation prepares the socket for incoming connections. In listen(), it is define that how many number of pending connections that can be queued up at any one time on the specified socket.
• Accept a connection with the accept() system call. This works as passive open operation because it is a blocking the process and wait until a remote participant has established.
• Send and receive data via the connection.
CHAPTER 6. EVALUATION
Setup
For the evaluation two virtual machines created in a Dell laptop was used. One virtual machine configured as server by allocating more resources (memory, storage etc) while the other virtual machine setup as the client with less resources. The configuration settings are shown in Table 6 .1. 
Access Pattern
In order to prove server cannot distinguish between two quires, results were obtained for querying same and random item for multiple times. The total number of items are set to N=256.
Both same item and random item were queried for 200,500 and 1000 times respectively. Table 6 .2 and 6.3 shows how many times each layer gets queried for different number of items (N). This also shows that number of times each layer gets queried is nearly the same for both the same item and random item cases. 
Overhead
The communication overhead includes both query and shuffling overheads. Results for these are shown in Table 6 .4 and 6.5. According to the results, measured communication overhead of implementation is consistent with theoretical results. 
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION
Cloud base storage popularity has increased in recent past because of its cost effectiveness compared to traditional storage systems. In this work we implemented a multi user customized
Oblivious RAM (C-ORAM) to efficiently protect users' data security and privacy in cloud storage. Data encryption does not fully guarantee the users privacy in cloud environment because the patterns of data access could leak considerable information about that stored data.
Oblivious RAM techniques suggested by previous studies as a method of protecting users access pattern from a curios server. It uses continuous data re-encryption and shuffling in order to conceal users access pattern. Most of the suggested ORAM schemes assume a single user to cloud storage. However, in practice it not the case. In C-ORAM we assume mutually trusted multi user scenario instead of traditional single user.
Evaluation of the system in terms of access pattern preservation and performance shows that C-ORAM can fully protect users access pattern. C-ORAM needs constant user-side storage and the overhead results for query and shuffling in the implementation has a closer match to the theoretical results.
